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Closed Material Procedures and the Right to a 
Fair Trial 
 
JOHN SULLIVAN†  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being charged with a crime and then sent to jail without 
having an opportunity to hear or rebut the evidence against you. 
While this may sound like a “Kafkaesque”1 nightmare, it has become 
a reality for some.2 In the United Kingdom, ex parte proceedings are 
used to convict defendants, and their use has expanded markedly in 
recent years through both court decisions and acts of Parliament.3 
These proceedings, known as Closed Material Procedures (CMPs) or 
“secret courts,”4 are used when the government presents information 
to the court, the disclosure of which would be “contrary to the public 
 
† Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2014-2015; J.D. 
Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The 
author wishes to thank Professor Michael Van Alstine for his guidance and the 
editors of the Maryland Journal of International Law for their assistance with this 
Comment. 
1. After reviewing evidence related to the use of Closed Material Procedures, 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights “found it hard not to reach for 
well worn descriptions of it as ‘Kafkaesque.’” JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT 
AND POST-CHARGE QUESTIONING, 2006-7, H.L. 157, H.C. 394, at 55 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
2. See, e.g., Ann King, Row Continues Over Secret Jailing of Wanda 
Maddocks at Father's Stoke-on-Trent Care Home, SENTINEL (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/Row-continues-secret-jailing-Wanda-
Maddocks/story-18812294-detail/story.html (explaining recent acts and decisions 
concerning Closed Material Procedures). 
3. See Christopher Forsyth, Principle or Pragmatism: Closed Material 
Procedure in the Supreme Court, U.K. CONST. L.  BLOG (July 29, 2013, 6:56 AM), 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/07/29/christopher-forsyth-principle-or-
pragmatism-closed-material-procedure-in-the-supreme-court/. 
4. Owen Bowcott, What are Secret Courts? GUARDIAN, June 15, 2013, at 19. 
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interest”5 or “damaging to the interests of national security.”6 The use 
and expansion of secret courts has come against the cries of human 
rights activists, including Parliament’s own Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (Joint Committee).7 
 This comment argues that CMPs violate the right to a fair trial, a 
right protected by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), to which the United Kingdom is a party,8 and undermine the 
adversarial legal system. Part I of this article will discuss the creation 
of the ECHR and how it interacts with laws in the United Kingdom.9 
Part II will explore the history of CMPs, outlining their origin, the 
expansion of their use, and their role today.10 Part III will assess the 
compatibility of CMPs with the ECHR and discuss the benefits and 
drawbacks of their use.11 Part IV will conclude the comment with a 
look at how the use of CMPs can be modified to comport with human 
rights in the future.12 
I. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 In 1950, the United Kingdom helped draft, and then adopted, the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, more commonly known as the European Convention on 
Human Rights.13 The ECHR guarantees a number of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, including the right to a fair trial, the right 
 
5. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, 2011, c. 23, § 18, sch. 
4 (U.K.). 
6. Justice and Security Act, 2013, c. 18 (U.K.). 
7. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT AND POST-CHARGE QUESTIONING, 
2006-7, H.L. 157, H.C. 394, at 55 (U.K.) (concluding that the process is “offensive 
to the basic principles of adversarial justice”). The Joint Committee for Human 
Rights is a select committee with members from both the House of Commons and 
House of Lords. Joint Committee on Human Rights –Role, U.K. PARLIAMENT, 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-
rights-committee/role/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
8. See European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].  
9. See infra Part I 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
13. European Convention, supra note 8; Human Rights, U.K. MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov.uk/human-rights (last updated Nov. 15, 2013).  
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to life, and the right to liberty.14 It provides for freedom of speech 
and prohibits torture and discrimination.15 
 The right to a fair trial is provided for in Article 6 of the 
ECHR.16 Under this right, individuals are entitled to “a fair and 
public hearing” and a public pronouncement of the judgment, “but 
the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in 
the interests of morals, public order or national security.”17 An 
individual charged with a criminal offense has additional rights, 
including the right “to defend himself . . . through legal assistance of 
his own choosing” and “to examine or have examined witnesses 
against him.”18 
 The language of the ECHR indicates that the right to a public 
judgment is not absolute.19 This exception, however, is not tied to any 
right relating to the procedure or substance of a trial—it merely refers 
to the pronouncement of the judgment. Moreover, it only allows the 
exclusion of the press and public, not parties to the litigation.20 In the 
sections relating to rights in criminal proceedings, they are referred to 
as “minimum rights” and contain no exception.21 
 The ECHR also established a permanent court “[t]o ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the . . . Parties in the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto.”22 This court, known as the 
European Court of Human Rights, hears cases between individuals 
and States as well as inter-State disputes.23 Decisions by the Court are 
binding on the parties;24 however, the Court does not have the ability 
to strike domestic legislation that is found to be incompatible with the 
 
14. European Convention, supra note 8, arts. 2, 5, 6.  
15. Id. arts. 3, 10, 14. 
16. Id. art. 6. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See id.  
20. See id. (“[T]he press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”) 
21. Id. 
22. Id. art. 19. 
23. EUR. CT. H.R., THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 6 (2012) [hereinafter ECHR IN 
50 QUESTIONS], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ 
ENG.pdf. 
24. Id. at 9. 
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ECHR.25 The Court’s ability to provide relief is limited to providing a 
declaratory judgment that the ECHR has been violated and “just 
satisfaction to the injured party” in the form of a financial award.26 
 When a violation is found, the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe is charged with ensuring the offending state 
complies with the Court’s judgment.27 The Committee of Ministers 
then “confers with the country concerned . . . to decide . . . how to 
prevent similar violations of the Convention in the future.”28 
However, it ultimately falls to the state to amend or adopt legislation 
to fix incompatibilities.29 
 In 1998, the United Kingdom passed the Human Rights Act 
1998 (1998 Act), which made the ECHR enforceable in U.K. 
courts.30 The 1998 Act requires legislation, “[s]o far as it is possible 
to . . . be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights.”31 If it is not possible, a court can make a 
declaration of incompatibility, however, such a declaration “does not 
affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the 
provision.”32 The 1998 Act provides for remedial orders, which 
allows legislation to be quickly amended when a court finds an 
incompatibility.33 However, this is permissive, rather than mandatory 
authority, and it still requires Parliament to pass the amended 
legislation.34 Therefore, while the European Court of Human Rights 
and U.K. courts can declare a law incompatible with the ECHR, 
 
25. General Measures: Information from Cases Closed, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Documents/MGindex_en.asp (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2014) [hereinafter General Measures]. 
26. Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, The Power of the European Court of Human Rights 
to Order Specific Non-Monetary Relief: a Critical Appraisal from a Right to Health 
Perspective, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 52 (2010). 
27. ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS, supra note 23, at 10.  
28. Id. 
29. General Measures, supra note 25. 
30. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.); Human Rights, supra note 13.  
31. Human Rights Act, art. 3. 
32. Id. arts. 3–4. 
33. DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A GUIDE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACT 1998: THIRD EDITION 7 (2006), available at https://www.justice.gov.uk/downl 
oads/human-rights/act-studyguide.pdf. 
34. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SEVENTH REPORT, 2001-02, H.L. 
73, H.C. 151 (U.K.). 
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Parliament still has complete authority over U.K. laws, even when 
they violate human rights. 
II.    THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECRET COURTS  
 A.    Use in the Family Division 
 The use of secret courts has long been a facet of the family court 
system in the United Kingdom.35 In cases before the Family Division, 
such as the removal of a child from his or her parents, it is illegal to 
reveal details of the proceedings or the judgments.36 The names of the 
social workers and others who allege misconduct are similarly kept 
secret.37 The justification for this secrecy is to protect the children 
involved.38 However, these practices have come under scrutiny in 
recent years.39 This level of secrecy makes it possible for the family 
courts to make decisions without facing the kind of exposure that 
ensures accountability.40 
 Recognizing this problem in Re J (A Child), Sir James Munby, 
president of the Family Division of the High Court,41 rejected 
portions of an injunction that sought to prevent video of a child being 
seized by British authorities from being distributed.42 The purpose of 
the injunction was to protect the identity of the child, but called for 
the local authority and social workers identities’ to also be protected 
in order to achieve this goal.43 Responding to this argument, Lord 
Justice Munby stated, “I simply fail to see how naming the local 
authority, [or] the social workers . . . can in any realistic way be said 
 
35. See Bowcott, supra note 4 (“Cases in the family division of the high court 
relating to child custody and divorce issues are regularly held in camera to protect 
privacy”.). 
36. Editorial, Unnatural Justice, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 26, 2007, at Tel. 24. 
37. Steve Doughty, Top Judge's War on Secret Courts: Family Hearings Must 
be Exposed to 'Glare of Publicity,' DAILY MAIL (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.dailym 
ail.co.uk/news/article-2413373/Top-judges-war-secret-courts-Family-hearings-
exposed-glare-publicity.html. 
38. Id. 
39. See, e.g., Unnatural Justice, supra note 36 (discussing the United 
Kingdom’s use of forcible adoptions and criticizing the lack of transparency in the 
U.K. courts which use secret proceedings to accomplish these “appalling acts of 
injustice”).  
40. See Doughty, supra note 37. 
41. Owen Bowcott, Order to Publish Secret Family Court Judgments, 
GUARDIAN, Jan 17, 2014, at 14. 
42. Re J (A Child), [2013] EWHC (Fam) 2694 [84] (Eng.). 
43. Id. ¶ 69. 
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to make it ‘likely’ that [the child] will be identified, even indirectly. 
The risk is merely fanciful.”44  
 In his judgment, Lord Justice Munby discussed the need for 
more transparency in the family justice system as a whole.45 One 
aspect of this need for transparency is the right of the public to know 
“what is being done in its name.”46 Furthermore, confidence in the 
family justice system requires the freedom of speech that comes with 
transparency, which “facilitates the exposure of errors in the . . . 
administration of justice of the country.”47 Lord Justice Munby then 
stressed how important family court decisions are to illustrate why 
vigilance is needed to guard against the risks of “miscarriages of 
justice.”48 As a result of this ruling, judgments in the family court 
will be published, excluding the names of the families involved.49 
This will help the court’s “workings to be properly scrutinized—so 
that the judges and other participants in the process remain visible 
and amenable to comment and criticism.”50 
 However, despite this step in the right direction, the family 
courts are only the beginning when it comes to secret courts in 
Britain.51 In the family court, secrecy was used to prevent identifying 
details from being released to the public. This lack of transparency 
was concerning for all of the reasons stated by Lord Justice Munby, 
but the parties to the proceedings had access to all of the information 
presented to the court. CMPs, on the other hand, prevent parties from 
 
44. Id. ¶ 70. 
45. Id. ¶¶ 25–40. 
46. Id. ¶ 27. 
47. Id. ¶ 31 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
48. Id. ¶ 29. “When a family judge makes a placement order or an adoption 
order in relation to a twenty-year old mother’s baby, the mother will have to live 
with the consequences of that decision for what may be upwards of 60 or even 70 
years, and the baby for what may be upwards of 80 or even 90 years.” Id. ¶ 28. 
49. See Sue Reid, For Years I Fought Against Secret Courts Breaking Up 
Families. At Last There's Hope, DAILY MAIL (July 24, 2013), http://www.dailymail 
.co.uk/news/article-2377084/SUE-REID-For-years-I-fought-secret-courts-
breaking-families-At-theres-hope.html. 
50. Re J (A Child), [2013] EWHC 2694 [32] (Eng.). 
51. See Bowcott, supra note 4 (suggesting that U.K. courts are likely to see 
more intelligence-related cases in the future). 
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seeing evidence presented against them, which may result in being 
the basis for a decision.52 
B.    The Introduction of CMPs 
 The use of CMPs in the United Kingdom started with 
immigration proceedings, when the government wanted to detain or 
deport an individual on the basis of national security.53 However, in 
1996 in Chahal v. United Kingdom,54 the European Court of Human 
Rights found this system to violate Article 13 of the ECHR.55 In the 
underlying deportation proceeding, a panel advised the Home 
Secretary as to whether there were grounds to deport Chahal; 
however, the contents of this advice was not provided to Chahal nor 
was he allowed legal representation.56 Furthermore, because of the 
secrecy behind the advice, it was not available for review upon 
appeal, and the higher court merely “satisf[ied] themselves that the 
Home Secretary had balanced the risk to Mr. Chahal against the 
danger to national security.”57 The Court said that these procedures 
“could not be considered to offer sufficient procedural safeguards for 
the purposes of Article 13.”58 
 In response to this ruling, Parliament passed the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (1997 Act).59 The 1997 
Act created the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), 
which hears appeals in cases involving “exclusion, departure or 
deportation in the interests of national security.”60 The 1997 Act 
allows the Lord Chancellor of the Commission to exclude the 
“appellant and any legal representative appointed by him.”61 When 
the appellant is excluded from a proceeding, the 1997 Act allows a 
 
52. See id. (stating that special advocates can only reveal a “loose summary” of 
the evidence). 
53. See Q&A: Secret Court Explained, BBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2004, 10:23 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3666235.stm (discussing the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission).  
54. App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996).   
55. Id. ¶ 155. Article 13 reads: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.” Id. ¶ 140. 
56. Id. ¶ 130. 
57. Id. ¶ 153. 
58. Id. ¶ 154. 
59. Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, c. 68 (U.K.). 
60. Id. § 2(1)(g). 
61. Id. § 5(3)(b). 
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person to be appointed to “represent the interests of [the] appellant,” 
but the representative “shall not be responsible to the person whose 
interests he is appointed to represent.”62 The SIAC heard very few 
cases before the September 11 attacks.63 However, after the attacks, 
Parliament passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
(2001 Act).64 The 2001 Act allowed the Home Secretary to detain 
terrorist suspects without trial.65 Their appeals went to the SIAC, 
which is where the procedure used in CMPs today began to take 
shape.66 
 In order to initiate a CMP, the Home Secretary notifies the 
Attorney General that the decision to detain was based in part on 
secret intelligence.67 The Attorney General then appoints a “special 
advocate” to the appellant, as provided for in the 1997 Act.68 As the 
1997 Act states, this special advocate represents the interests of the 
appellant but is not responsible to him.69 In practice, this means that 
the representative is allowed to see the secret evidence presented by 
the Home Secretary and advocate on behalf of the appellant when the 
judge considers this evidence, but the representative may not disclose 
it or discuss it with the appellant afterwards.70 This takes place before 
the hearing, when the judge decides whether evidence should be 
opened.71 Then, after the appellant puts on his case, and all other 
open evidence is presented, the special advocate takes over again to 
challenge the closed evidence.72 However, because the appellant is 
excluded from this phase, the special advocate cannot take instruction 
from the appellant.73 
 
62. Id. § 6(1), (4). 
63. See Q&A: Secret Court Explained, supra note 53 (“SIAC was rarely used 
as deportations of this nature were few and far between.”).  
64. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.). 
65. Q&A: Secret Court Explained, supra note 53. 
66. See id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, c. 68, § 6(4) (U.K.). 
70. Q&A: Secret Court Explained, supra note 53. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
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 The authority of the government to detain suspects under the 
2001 Act was later declared to be incompatible with the ECHR.74 As 
discussed previously, a declaration of incompatibility under the 1998 
Act does not mandate a change to the offending legislation;75 
however, Parliament decided to fix the incompatibility in the 2001 
Act with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (2005 Act).76 The 
2005 Act repealed the detention provisions of the 2001 Act and 
replaced them by giving the Home Secretary the authority to issue 
“control orders,” which restrict suspects from carrying certain objects 
or carrying out specified activities.77 While this change limited the 
cases in which secret courts would be needed, it did nothing to 
address the fairness concerns when CMPs are used. 
 In 2007, the Joint Committee published a report after hearing 
oral evidence from special advocates as to how CMPs operate.78 The 
Joint Committee found that special advocates “had a number of very 
serious reservations about the fairness of the system to the people 
whose interests they are appointed to represent.”79 These reservations 
included the lack of information provided to the individual, the 
prohibition on communication between the special advocate and the 
individual once the advocate has seen the evidence, and the low 
standard of proof.80 The special advocates testified that CMPs have 
“absolutely nothing to do with the traditions of adversarial justice as 
we have come to understand them in the British legal system.”81 
After hearing this testimony, the Joint Committee “found it hard not 
to reach for well worn descriptions of [CMPs] as ‘Kafkaesque.’”82 
C.    Recent Expansion of the Use of CMPs 
 Despite condemnation from the Joint Committee, Parliament 
passed the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (2008 Act), which authorized 
 
74. A & others v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
75. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
76. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (U.K.). 
77. Id. §§ 1, 16. “Control orders” were repealed and replaced with a similar 
mechanism by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, 2011, c. 23, §§ 1, 2 (U.K.). 
78. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT AND POST-CHARGE QUESTIONING, 2006-7, 
H.L. 157, H.C. 394 (U.K.). 
79. Id. ¶ 192.  
80. Id. ¶ 193. 
81. Id. ¶ 210. 
82. Id. 
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the use of CMPs in cases involving the funding of terrorist 
organizations.83 The statute also allowed CMPs to be used by certain 
appellate courts, although it did not mention the Supreme Court.84 In 
2013, however, the Supreme Court found it had the implicit authority 
under the 2008 Act to use a CMP to review evidence that had been 
presented to a lower court in a CMP.85 In this case, Bank Mellat v. 
Her Majesty’s Treasury, Parliament approved a Treasury order to 
shut down Bank Mellat’s U.K. operations because of their potential 
involvement with funding Iran’s nuclear program.86 The Court read 
the closed judgment from the earlier CMP, and heard argument on it 
in a closed session of its own.87 In reversing the order, the Court said, 
“there was no point in our seeing the closed judgment. There was 
nothing in it which could have . . . influenced the outcome of th[e] 
appeal.”88 The Court then explained guidelines for appellate courts to 
follow related to CMPs.89 
 Judges who rely on closed material in closed judgments are 
instructed to “say in the open judgment as much as can properly be 
said about the closed material which he has relied on.”90 This will 
also lessen the need for a closed hearing on appeal if the information 
presented in the CMP was not central to the judgment.91 Judges are 
urged to try to avoid CMPs in the first place, but if they are 
necessary, as much of the information provided should be given to 
the excluded party as is possible.92  
 While some saw the decision as limiting the role of CMPs in 
Britain,93 it came against the backdrop of the Court finding it had the 
 
83. Counter-Terrorism Act, 2008, c. 28 (U.K.). 
84. Id. “‘[R]ules of court’ means rules for regulating the practice and 
procedure to be followed in the High Court or the Court of Appeal or in the Court 
of Session.” Id. § 73. 
85. Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, [2013] UKSC 38 [64–65] (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
86. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 
87. Id. ¶ 65. 
88. Id. ¶ 66. 
89. See id. ¶¶ 67–74. 
90. Id. ¶ 69. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. ¶ 72. 
93. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Supreme Court Quashes Iran Bank Sanctions 
and Criticises Secret Hearings, GUARDIAN (June 19, 2013, 7:30 AM), 
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implicit authority to use CMPs.94 Writing in dissent, Lord Hope took 
the position that because CMPs erode fundamental common law 
principles, the Court did not have the authority to use them absent an 
express grant by Parliament.95 In two separate dissents, Lords Kerr 
and Reed echoed this sentiment.96 Lord Dyson, meanwhile, wrote 
that he believed the Supreme Court had the authority to use CMPs 
but that they should decline to do so in the case at hand.97 The Court 
therefore urged restraint when appellate courts consider CMPs, but 
ignored its own advice and set the precedent that secrecy was 
permissible even at the highest level of the court system.98 
 The dissenters in Bank Mellat relied heavily on the opinion of 
Lord Dyson in Al Rawi & Ors v. Security Service & Ors.99 In that 
case, the Supreme Court refused to extend CMPs to civil cases absent 
express authorization from Parliament.100 The claimants sued the 
government for being “complicit in the detention and ill-treatment of 
them by foreign authorities at various locations including 
Guantanamo Bay.”101 The government wanted to present evidence to 
rebut this claim, but said it was in the public interest to prevent its 
disclosure and requested the court to allow a CMP to review the 
evidence.102 The claimants argued that the government should be 
required to follow the Public Interest Immunity (PII) procedure if it 
wanted to withhold evidence.103 A PII allows the government to 
 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jun/19/supreme-court-iran-bank-mellat-
sanctions-secret-hearing (observing that “[t]he government’s enthusiasm for secret 
courts has suffered a setback after the UK’s most senior judges quashed an anti-
terrorist sanction imposed on an Iranian bank and dismissed the intelligence 
involved as irrelevant”). 
94. See Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty’s Treasury [2013] UKSC 38 [65] (where 
the Court decided to have a closed hearing). 
95. “[T]he issue is so fundamental that it must be left to an express and 
carefully defined provision by Parliament. I do not think that a point of such 
fundamental importance can be left to implication.” Id. ¶ 87 (Hope, L., dissenting). 
96. “The plain fact is that Parliament . . . did not introduce such a procedure for 
the Supreme Court.” Id. ¶ 125 (Reed, L., dissenting). “[F]or the court to conduct a 
closed hearing is contrary to a fundamental principle of the common law, and 
therefore requires clear statutory authority. Even interpreted as generously as 
possible, the 2005 Act cannot in my opinion be said to provide clear authority.” Id. 
¶ 138 (Hope, L., dissenting).  
97. Id. ¶ 141–45 (Dyson, L., dissenting in part). 
98. See id. ¶¶ 96–100, 137.  
99. [2011] UKSC 34 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
100. Id. ¶ 47. 
101. Id. ¶ 3. 
102. Id. ¶ 4. 
103. Id. ¶ 5. 
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present evidence to a judge, who then determines whether “the public 
interest which demands that the evidence be withheld outweighs the 
public interest in the administration of justice.”104 If the judge finds 
the evidence should be withheld, the government does not have to 
share it with the other party. However, unlike in a CMP, the evidence 
is prevented from being admitted or relied on by either party.105 
 The Court discussed the notion of open justice, finding it to be a 
key principle of common law.106 The Court also recognized that: 
[T]he common law is flexible. It develops over time in 
response to changing circumstances. But any change 
must be justified, otherwise the law becomes unstable.  
Sometimes, it takes giant steps forward. More often it 
evolves gradually and cautiously. This is particularly 
important where a change involves an inroad into a 
fundamental common law right. The introduction of a 
closed material procedure in ordinary civil claims 
(including claims for judicial review) would do just 
that.107 
In Tariq v. Home Office108 the Court found that CMPs in front of 
the Employment Tribunal did not violate Article 6 of the ECHR, but 
the Court stated that this was a separate question from whether it 
violated the common law because it is “open to member states to 
provide for rights more generous than those guaranteed by the 
Convention.”109 Following these principles, the Court decided that 
the introduction of CMPs to civil trials was too great a departure from 
common law, and should only occur if Parliament “sees fit to do 
so.”110 
 Parliament indeed saw fit to do just that with the Justice and 
Security Act 2013 (2013 Act),111 which gained Royal Assent on April 
 
104. Id. ¶ 145 (Clarke, L.). 
105. Id. ¶ 146. 
106. Id. ¶ 11 (Dyson, L.). 
107. Id. ¶ 67. 
108. [2011] UKSC 35 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
109. Al Rawi, [2011] UKSC at ¶ 68 (quoting R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator 
[2004] UKHL 26).  
110. Al Rawi, [2011] UKSC at ¶ 69. 
111. Justice and Security Act, 2013, c. 18 (U.K.). 
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25, 2013.112 The 2013 Act expanded the use of CMPs to civil cases 
for the first time.113 The Joint Committee on Human Rights issued 
reports along the way, which monitored the bill from its introduction 
as a Green Paper114 until its enactment.115 In its final report before the 
2013 Act was passed, the Joint Committee reiterated its skepticism 
that there was an actual, as opposed to hypothetical, need to expand 
CMPs to civil cases.116 
 Next, the Joint Committee addressed the principle of “equality of 
arms.”117 This principle states “each party must be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do 
not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.”118 
The European Court of Human Rights has recognized this principle 
as being a component of the concept of a fair trial, which is 
guaranteed by article 6 of the ECHR.119 The draft of the 2013 Act 
reviewed by the Joint Committee gave only the government the right 
to initiate a CMP.120 The Joint Committee recommended that the bill 
be amended so that either party, or the court on its own, could move 
for a CMP.121 This would also be more in line with the government’s 
asserted justification for the bill, which was to increase fairness for 
both parties.122 The Committee also recommended an amendment 
that would have allowed the court to consider whether a PII claim 
 
112. Tom Hickman, Turning Out the Lights? The Justice and Security Act 
2013, U.K. CONST. L. BLOG (June 11, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://ukconstitutionallaw. 
org/2013/06/11/tom-hickman-turning-out-the-lights-the-justice-and-security-act-
2013/. 
113. See id. (discussing how CMPs are an alternative to PII procedure in civil 
cases).  
114. “A Green Paper is a Government publication that details specific issues, 
and then points out possible courses of action in terms of policy and legislation.” 
What is a Green Paper?, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
careandsupportreform/what-green-paper. 
115. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: 
JUSTICE AND SECURITY BILL, 2012-13, H.L. 59, H.C. 370, ¶ 33 (U.K.) (stating that 
its report on the Green Paper, the Committee considered the Government’s 
justification for using CMPs in civil proceedings). 
116. Id. ¶¶ 33–34.  
117. See id. ¶¶ 46–52.  
118. De Haas & Gijsels v. Belgium, App. No. 19983/92, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 
40 (1997). 
119. See id. at 39–40 (reiterating that equality of arms is a component of the 
concept of a fair trial). 
120. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: JUSTICE 
AND SECURITY BILL, 2012-13, H.L. 59, H.C. 370, ¶ 47 (U.K.)  
121. Id. ¶ 51.  
122. Id. ¶¶ 50–51 
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would better balance the “degree of harm to . . . national security if 
the material is disclosed [compared to] the public interest in the fair 
and open administration of justice.”123 Additionally, the Joint 
Committee recommended a provision that CMPs only be used when 
“a fair determination of the proceedings is not possible by any other 
means.”124 
 Another concern of the Joint Committee was the effect the 2013 
Act would have on the media and public trust in the judiciary.125 The 
government proposed a database accessible to special advocates that 
listed head notes of closed judgments; however, the Joint Committee 
preferred for the media to be “notified of any application for closed 
material procedures to be used, to ensure an opportunity for the 
media to make representations on that question, and to provide a 
mechanism for a party to apply for a closed judgment to become an 
open judgment.”126 Finally, the Joint Committee requested a system 
of monitoring and annual review of the use of CMPs, in order to 
ensure the intended limitations were not eroded.127 
 The Joint Committee’s report originally appeared to be a 
significant setback for the legislation.128 Nonetheless, the bill moved 
forward while adopting some, but not all, of the proposed 
amendments.129 One commenter suggested that the bill was originally 
so lopsided so the government could appear to make significant 
concessions while drawing attention away from “other issues of more 
concern.”130 One of these concessions was allowing both parties in 
addition the court to initiate CMPs, as well as for periodic reviews of 
how often CMPs are used in civil cases.131 
 
123. Id. ¶¶ 61–62 
124. Id. ¶ 67.  
125. Id. ¶ 107.  
126. Id. ¶¶ 107–08.  
127. Id. ¶¶ 111–12.  
128. See James Chapman, Plans for Secret Justice Left in Turmoil After 
Ministers ‘Fail to Win the Argument’ to Justify More Hearings Being Held Behind 
Closed Doors, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/artic 
le-2232125/Ministers-fail-win-argument-secret-courts.html (suggesting that “the 
Government will have difficulty getting the legislation through the House of 
Lords”).  
129. Hickman, supra note 112. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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 Despite the Joint Committee’s report, the government was able 
to hold its ground in a few areas. First, it prevented the language 
allowing CMPs only when fair proceedings are “not possible by any 
other means” and from requiring judges to consider whether a PII 
claim should have been made instead.132 The government also 
avoided the application of a balancing test in regards to specific 
evidence presented to the court.133 Instead, once a court enters a 
CMP, all of the material presented is barred from being disclosed, 
instead of the court being allowed to disclose the evidence presented 
that it believes would do little or no harm.134 Shortly after the bill 
passed, there was an effort to enhance the role of judges’ discretion 
under the system with a new amendment, but the measure failed to 
gain a majority in the House of Lords.135 
III.  DO CMPS VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL?  
 Article 6 of the ECHR provides for the right to a fair and public 
trial, with limited exceptions allowing for private judgments and the 
exclusion of the press and public.136 Measured against the plain 
language of the ECHR, CMPs are seemingly incompatible with this 
and other associated rights.137 The appointment of a special advocate 
has been criticized for denying the right to choose one’s legal 
assistance.138 This may not be an issue in a case where a defendant 
cannot pay for legal representation and is appointed an attorney, 
because the choice has already been taken out of his hands. In that 
case, a neutral court appoints the representation, instead of the 
Attorney General, who is an interested party.139 However, in a case 
 
132. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: JUSTICE 
AND SECURITY BILL (SECOND REPORT), 2012-13, H.L. 128, H.C. 1014, at 4–5 
(U.K.). 
133. Tom Hickman, Justice & Security Bill: Defeat, or Not a Defeat: That is 
the Question, U.K. CONST. L. BLOG (Nov. 27, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://ukconstitutio 
nallaw.org/2012/11/27/tom-hickman-justice-security-bill-defeat-or-not-a-defeat-
that-is-the-question/.  
134. Id. 
135. See Nicholas Watt, Last-Ditch Bid to Dilute Secret Courts Plan Fails, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/mar/27/secret-
courts-plan-fails (stating that the Labour amendment would permit “the CMPs to be 
convened only if a judge rules that it would be impossible to reach a fair verdict ‘by 
any other means.’”).  
136. European Convention, supra note 8, art. 6.  
137. See EQUAL. & HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, Article 6: The Right to a Fair 
Trial, in HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 2012, 227–40 (2012), available at http://www.eq 
ualityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/humanrights/hrr_article_6.pdf. 
138. Id. at 238.  
139. Id. at 229. 
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such as Bank Mellat, a large international bank clearly has the 
resources to pay for their legal counsel, and appointing them a special 
advocate would therefore violate their right to choice of legal 
assistance. 
 CMPs also violate the right of a defendant to examine witnesses 
against him.140 A defendant in a CMP is not presented with the 
evidence against him, and has no opportunity to rebut it.141 The 
special advocate may do his best to challenge evidence on behalf of 
his client, but without being able to discuss the information with the 
defendant, his ability to do this is severely limited.142 
 While the plain language of the Convention clearly would not 
permit CMPs, the European Court of Human Rights has found that 
there are implicit limitations to the right to a fair trial.143 In Edwards 
and Lewis v. United Kingdom, the Court said: 
The entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is 
not, however, an absolute right. In any criminal 
proceedings there may be competing interests, such as 
national security or the need to . . . keep secret police 
methods of investigation of crime, which must be 
weighed against the rights of the accused. In some 
cases it may be necessary to withhold certain evidence 
from the defence so as to . . . safeguard an important 
public interest. Nonetheless, only such measures 
restricting the rights of the defence which are strictly 
necessary are permissible under Article 6 § 1. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure that the accused 
receives a fair trial, any difficulties caused to the 
defence by a limitation on its rights must be 
 
140. LEFT IN THE DARK: THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 11 (2012), available at http://www.amnesty. 
org/en/library/asset/EUR45/014/2012/en/546a2059-db83-4888-93ba-
8b90cc32a2de/eur450142012en.pdf.  
141. See id. (describing how individuals are only given “vague and broad 
allegations” about their case and are not provided the opportunity to respond to the 
case against them).  
142. See id. at 11–12 (discussing how special advocates often are only 
checking the evidence for inconsistencies or identifying where the evidence does 
not support the allegations, rather than directly challenging the evidence).  
143. Edwards & Lewis v. United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 16 (2004). 
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sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures 
followed by the judicial authorities.144 
Under this standard, there appears to be room for CMPs in some 
form. The European Court of Human Rights used the language 
“strictly necessary,” however the British acts that authorize the use of 
CMPs have much lower thresholds.145 In fact, the “strictly necessary” 
standard is very similar to the “not possible by other means” 
language that the government was able to avoid having placed in the 
2013 Act.146 
 The Joint Committee also raised concerns that the scope of 
information that the government could use to trigger a CMP was too 
broad.147 While the threshold was raised from material that could 
harm the “public interest” as written in the Green Paper to material 
which “carries a real risk of harm to national security,” in the actual 
legislation the question remained as to what constituted “material” 
for the purposes of the 2013 Act.148 The Committee recommended 
that material be confined to two narrow categories: (1) information 
that would reveal the identity of intelligence officers or their sources 
and (2) information that was “provided by another country on a 
promise of confidentiality.”149 The Committee specifically addressed 
diplomatic exchanges and said that they should not be covered, even 
if they were labeled as secret, and even if their disclosure would 
result in embarrassment or damage international relations.150 These 
 
144. Id. 
145. See Justice and Security Act, 2013, c. 18, § 6(11) (U.K.) (“[M]aterial the 
disclosure of which would be damaging to the interests of national security”); 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, 2011, c. 23, § 2(b), sch. 4  
(U.K.) (“[D]isclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary 
to the public interest”); Counter-Terrorism Act, 2008, c. 28, § 66(2)(b) (U.K.) 
(“[D]isclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary to the 
public interest”); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 2(b) (U.K.) 
(“[D]isclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary to the 
public interest”).  
146. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: 
JUSTICE AND SECURITY BILL, 2012–13, H.L. 128, H.C. 1014, at ¶ 77 (U.K.) 
(disagreeing with the Government’s removal of the “last resort” amendments and 
advising that the bill be amended to include “not possible by any other means” 
language). 
147. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: JUSTICE 
AND SECURITY BILL, 2012–13, H.L. 59, H.C. 370, at ¶¶ 99–100 (U.K.). 
148. Id. ¶¶ 20–22. 
149. Id. ¶ 29. 
150. Id. ¶ 26.  
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kinds of materials might be said to harm the public interest, but do 
not reach the standard of a “real risk of harm to national security.”151 
Ultimately, Parliament ignored the Committee’s recommendations, as 
neither the proposed clauses nor any similar language restricting what 
defines “sensitive material” was included in the final legislation.152 
 This language would have been an opportunity to limit CMPs to 
the “strictly necessary” standard by defining what “sensitive 
material” was rather than through the definition of when a CMP 
could be used (i.e., harm to public interest vs. national security). The 
failure of Parliament to do so in either form means that the 
government’s authority to use CMPs is broader than the European 
Court of Human Rights deemed permissible and is therefore 
incompatible with the ECHR. 
 In addition to the burdens CMPs place on a defendant trying to 
avoid criminal punishment, CMPs also limit the ability of those who 
have been wronged from recovering from the government.153 With 
the expansion of CMPs to civil cases, individuals who have had their 
rights violated, such as the plaintiff in Al Rawi, may have no way of 
proving their case. For example, if a prisoner alleges he was tortured 
and sues the government, the government could initiate a CMP, 
making it impossible for the plaintiff to discover evidence that might 
be essential to his case. This allows the government to not only avoid 
judgments against it, but to hide behaviors deserving of public 
scrutiny.154 
 While the authority of the government to use CMPs and the 
fairness of the procedures involved raise major human rights issues, 
there are arguments to be made in support of CMPs. First and 
foremost is the possibility that certain evidence would, if released to 
 
151. Id. ¶ 21. 
152. Justice and Security Act, 2013, c. 18, § 6(11) (U.K.) (“‘[S]ensitive 
material’ means the disclosure of which would be damaging to the interests of 
national security.”). 
153. See LEFT IN THE DARK, supra note 140, at 34 (discussing the concern that 
the use of CMPs undermines the Government’s ability to ensure that anyone 
alleging that the U.K. was responsible for human rights violations “has access to a 
fair and effective procedure for establishing their claims and obtaining an effective 
remedy”).  
154. See id. at 36. 
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the public, threaten national security.155 As the Joint Committee 
identified, information related to the identities of intelligence agents, 
or the methods used to obtain certain evidence against a defendant, 
could threaten national security if released.156 This argument does 
hold water, as even the European Court of Human Rights has 
acknowledged that national security may sometimes require the 
abridgement of some rights.157 However, the issue is not that there is 
never a time or place for CMPs, but that their use has been extended 
to situations far beyond what is necessary.158 Parliament has given 
the government the ability to use them in cases where national 
security is likely not threatened.159 The Joint Committee devoted a 
large portion of their report on the 2013 Act to this issue,160 but the 
final legislation remained unchanged. 
 Another argument in support of CMPs is the fact that the 
evidence presented by the government, while not released to the 
opposing party, is still reviewed by an impartial judge.161 In Bank 
Mellat, the evidence that was shown in secret was unconvincing to 
the Court, and the government lost the case.162 Similarly, in civil 
cases, while the government may be able to hide the evidence of its 
actions from the plaintiff, a judge will still review it and can still find 
 
155. See James Chapman & Jason Groves, Secret Courts Plan in Chaos: Lords 
Reject Closed Hearings by Crushing Majority, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 22, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2236585/Secret-courts-plan-chaos-Lords-
reject-closed-hearings-crushing-majority.html (stating that the security services 
argued that countries may no longer share intelligence with Britain if that 
intelligence could be disclosed in open court).  
156. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: JUSTICE 
AND SECURITY BILL, 2012-13, H.L. 59, H.C. 370, ¶ 99 (U.K.). 
157. Edwards & Lewis v. United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 12 (2004). 
158. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: 
JUSTICE AND SECURITY BILL, 2012–13, H.L. 59, H.C. 370,  ¶ 64 (U.K.) 
(emphasizing that CMPs be adopted only when strictly necessary). 
159. See id. (stating that there is nothing in the Bill “to ensure that CMPs will 
only be resorted to as a matter of last resort when a trial could not otherwise 
proceed”).  
160. See generally id. (recommending several amendments limiting the scope 
of CMPs, such as making the matter of application subject to genuine judicial 
discretion and ensuring that a CMP is only permitted as a last resort). 
161. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: 
JUSTICE AND SECURITY BILL, 2012–13, ORAL EVIDENCE H.C. 370–I–III (U.K.) 
(stating that it should be left to the court rather than the government to trigger a 
CMP so that the decision maker is impartial and independent of the Executive).  
162. Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, [2013] UKSC 38, ¶ 96 (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
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that the government is guilty. However, this should not provide too 
much comfort. In the situation of a civil case, while the government 
may still be responsible for the actions alleged, the details of its 
actions are still hidden from the public.163 Lord Justice Munby 
stressed how important public scrutiny of the government is in 
relation to the Family Courts,164 and it is similarly important in the 
context of monitoring how the government treats its citizens, 
prisoners, or anyone else. 
 Furthermore, while an impartial judge may review the evidence, 
CMPs eliminate the adversarial component to trials that is 
fundamental to the U.K. legal system, as well as the ECHR.165 A 
“special advocate” cannot effectively rebut evidence because they 
cannot communicate with their client. Many special advocates have 
admitted that: 
[T]heir ability to challenge the government’s case 
against an individual is often limited to identifying 
where allegations made by the Secretary of State 
might be unsupported by the evidence the government 
is relying on . . . rather than directly refuting or 
challenging the evidence as they would be able to in 
ordinary, open proceedings.166 
Similarly, in the open portions of the trial, the representatives 
cannot adequately present their client’s case, because they don’t 
know what evidence they have to disprove.167 As one lawyer 
described it, “you are speaking into a black hole because you have no 
idea if your strategy and points are on the money or wide of the 
mark.”168 
 Finally, advocates of CMPs argue that their use allows the 
government to move forward on cases that they might otherwise be 
forced to settle because they are unwilling to present certain evidence 
to the public.169 A plaintiff could abuse this by making claims that he 
 
163. LEFT IN THE DARK, supra note 140, at 36.  
164. Re J (A Child), [2013] EWHC 2694 (Fam.) [27] (Eng,).  
165. LEFT IN THE DARK, supra note 140, at 39.  
166. Id. at 11. 
167. Id. at 5. 
168. Id. at 11.  
169. See, e.g., Chapman & Groves, supra note 155 (quoting a special advocate 
who states that the Government has had to settle cases because the relevant material 
would violate national security and therefore could not be put before the court).  
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knows the government cannot rebut without releasing sensitive 
information. The government must then decide whether to expose 
itself or settle a case that it would have won. This kind of precedent 
could lead to a slippery slope of meritless claims that receive 
settlements. While this concern may be real, ultimately, it should not 
be a basis for CMPs. The government should be required to make a 
decision as to whether the potential damage by submitting evidence 
in public is outweighed by the cost of a settlement.170 In the potential 
case of repeated claims against the government, the scale would tip 
towards submitting the evidence. If plaintiffs are making claims 
against the government that have substance to them, and cannot be 
defeated without sensitive information, then the government should 
be held accountable and provide a public explanation for what 
happened.171 Avoiding settlements is simply not a valid justification 
for violating human rights. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF CMPS 
 As the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged, there 
may be times when CMPs are necessary.172 There are undoubtedly 
situations in which national security could be threatened if the 
government were forced to present certain “sensitive material.”173 
PII’s may be insufficient in cases where the government needs to rely 
on this material in order to convict someone who, if let go, would 
pose a threat to the public.174 However, as the Joint Committee has 
reported, the authority of the government to use CMPs has extended 
far beyond their actual need, to the point where the plain meaning of 
the statutes authorizing CMPs are incompatible with the ECHR.175 
 Given that the right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the ECHR, it 
would seem that the European Court of Human Rights would have 
 
170. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: JUSTICE 
AND SECURITY BILL, 2012–13, H.L. 59, H.C. 370, at 41 (U.K.). 
171. See LEFT IN THE DARK, supra note 140, at 37 (describing how 
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172. Edwards & Lewis v. United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 16 (2004). 
173. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: JUSTICE 
AND SECURITY BILL, REPORT, 2012–13, H.L. 59, H.C. 370, at 29 (U.K.). 
174. See id. at 56 (discussing the likelihood of real damage in a case where the 
individual was released to the U.K.).  
175. See EQUAL. & HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N 2012, supra note 137, at 230 
(“Any use of closed material that prevents a person from knowing the case against 
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breaching Article 6.”).  
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the greatest ability to modify the United Kingdom’s use of CMPs to 
comport with the ECHR. However, this is not the case for multiple 
reasons. First, the Court’s ability to bind the United Kingdom in its 
judgments is limited to ordering reparations.176 Any suggestion by the 
Committee of Ministers regarding amending domestic legislation is 
non-binding, and the United Kingdom has already displayed a 
willingness to disregard such suggestions.177 Second, the Court has 
fallen out of favor with a number of British officials, including Prime 
Minister David Cameron.178 Cameron and Home Secretary Theresa 
May have suggested that withdrawing from the ECHR and repealing 
the 1998 Act are possibilities in order to “keep [their] country 
safe.”179 Given this attitude, pressure from the European Court of 
Human Rights might lead to the United Kingdom withdrawing from 
the ECHR, rather than changing its policies. If that were to happen, 
there would no longer be any statutory authority to preserve the right 
to a fair trial. 
 Another option is for the Supreme Court to use its authority 
under the 1998 Act to interpret legislation in a way that is compatible 
with the ECHR. Given that the European Court of Human Rights set 
the threshold for the use of CMPs at “strictly necessary,” the Supreme 
Court could read this standard into provisions allowing the use of 
CMPs.180  In terms of the 1997 Act, this would merely require 
reading “necessary in the interests of national security” in a way that 
is supported by the first dictionary definition of “necessary”—that is, 
“absolutely needed.”181 In other acts, it would require interpreting 
language such as “disclosures . . . are not made where they would be 
contrary to the public interest.” The phrase “public interest” is a term 
of art, with any number of meanings. The Court could find that 
withholding information from the public is not in its interest, and 
therefore only the most damaging of information should be 
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concealed. These types of interpretations are far more restrained than 
other times in which the Court has utilized its interpretive authority 
under the 1998 Act.182 For example, in Ghaidan v. Godin-
Mendoza,183 the Court interpreted the phrase “as his or her wife or 
husband” to include unmarried homosexual couples who lived 
together.184 The fact that the terms “wife” and “husband” are 
unambiguous terms did not stop the Court from reinterpreting the 
phrase to avoid conflict with the ECHR.185 However, this approach 
could have a similar effect as a ruling from the European Court of 
Human Rights. Even coming from a domestic court, a ruling based 
on the ECHR would likely perpetuate the idea that it has usurped 
Parliament’s sovereignty. 
 Therefore, the real solution is for Parliament to act. As a drafter 
of the ECHR, the United Kingdom has a heightened responsibility to 
uphold its principles. This responsibility falls on the shoulders of 
Britain’s highest authority—Parliament. The idea that a global leader 
such as the United Kingdom would withdraw from a human rights 
convention it helped draft should be frightening. The efforts made to 
modify the 2013 Act and other preceding acts should be renewed, 
with a focus on the provisions that determine when the government 
can initiate CMPs. The bar should be raised to the “strictly 
necessary” or “not possible by other means” standard set by the 
European Court of Human Rights. Parliament should also heed the 
recommendation of the Joint Committee to limit “sensitive material” 
to material that is truly sensitive—that is, presents a real risk to 
national security, rather than material that, if released, might be 
inconvenient or damaging to the government’s reputation. This 
would further limit the use of CMPs to cases where they are truly 
necessary. 
 Furthermore, CMPs, as they work now, go too far in restricting 
parties opposing the government and undermine the adversarial legal 
system. Changes must be made in order to ensure that, even when 
CMPs are used, defendants have the ability to adequately defend 
themselves. The current system of “special advocates” does not allow 
for the communication between the defendant and his advocate that is 
necessary to sufficiently rebut evidence presented by the government. 
A change to this system, such as allowing for ongoing 
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communication between the advocate and defendant, even if the 
advocate cannot reveal specific details about the evidence, would at 
least improve the defendant’s ability to present his case. Special 
advocates are already trusted to not disclose the information to 
anyone. Preventing ongoing communication does nothing but add an 
unnecessary obstacle. If the government does not trust advocates to 
communicate without sharing specific evidence, then it should not 
employ them in the first place. Allowing the special advocate to 
remain involved in a case’s open proceedings would also improve the 
ability of the defendant to put on his case, as lawyers who are shut 
out of CMPs are in the dark as to what kind of arguments they need 
to make. 
 Every government has a responsibility to protect its people, and 
it will always be a struggle to find the right balance in how much 
power the government should have to fulfill this responsibility. 
However, there are certain principles, such as those enumerated in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, whose breach must be a last 
resort. As the Joint Committee stated, the Government in the United 
Kingdom has failed to show that they have reached such a last resort. 
That being the case, it is important to consider the ways CMPs can be 
modified to achieve their purpose without infringing on human rights. 
